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WHAT WOULD CONGRESS WANT? IF WE WANT TO KNOW, 
WHY NOT ASK? 
Danieli Evans∗ 
Judges often disagree about which interpretation of a statute is most 
faithful to ‘legislative intent.’  If judges are concerned about adhering to 
democratic preferences when interpreting statutes, why not ask 
Congress what it would prefer?  I propose a procedure that would 
enable the Court, in a case where Justices are divided over the meaning 
of a statute, to submit both sides’ reasoning to Congress, and Congress 
may choose to vote on its preferred of the alternative rulings the Court 
puts before it.  Congress’s preferences would be evidentiary only; they 
would not bind the Court to make one decision or another.  Insofar as 
the Court is concerned with avoiding a decision that Congress will 
overrule, this procedure could provide more reliable and direct 
evidence of what the contemporary Congress wants, than does post-
enactment legislative history, canons of construction, or other means 
judges use to adduce legislative intent.  This procedure would enable a 
partnership between the Court and Congress in updating and adapting 
the law to ever-changing circumstances; a partnership that draws upon 
each branch’s particular competencies—Congress being democratic, 
the Court accounting for overarching constitutional values and ideals of 
predictability, consistency, and intelligibility in the law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Most would agree that courts interpreting legislation should aim, as best 
possible, to adhere to the intent of the legislature.1  Inconsistency in the 
methods judges use to  decipher Congress’s intent has generated the 
impression that statutory interpretation decisions are ad hoc or made to suit 
the Court’s own outcome preferences.2  Debates about statutory meaning 
cause acrimony between the Justices, the Court, and Congress.3  Justice 
Scalia has criticized Congress for an “ever-increasing volume” of “[f]uzzy, 
leave-the-details-to-be-sorted-out-by-the-courts legislation,”4 and other 
members of the Court for reaching outcomes that “require[] not 
interpretation but invention.”5  Members of the public criticize judges for 
 
 1. E.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the 
Making and Application of Law, in WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 718 
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT] (“The 
court should respect the position of the legislature as chief policy-determining agency of the society, 
subject only to the limitations of the constitution.”); James J. Brudney, Recalibrating Federal Judicial 
Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 156 (2003); Russell Carparelli, Separate Powers-Shared 
Responsibility: Constructing Avenues of Interbranch Communication, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 267, 267 
(2007) (“[S]cholars and jurists have written countless books, articles, and opinions about the separation 
of powers and how courts should go about exercising their judgment to effect legislative intent.”). But 
Justice Scalia “reject[s] the intent of the legislature as the proper criterion of the law,” and instead 
argues that legislation should be given its “plain meaning,” regardless of intent.  Antonin Scalia, 
Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting 
the Constitution and Laws, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Princeton University 79, 94 (Mar. 
1995). 
 2. E.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological 
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1767 (2010) (observing that 
inconsistency in methodological approach “makes the Court appear results-oriented, because the 
governing principles change from case to case”); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of 
Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2005); Nicholas 
Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2086 (2002). 
This has been a pervasive concern dating back to Dean Pound’s worry about “spurious” statutory 
interpretation.  ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 1, at 706; Scalia, supra note 1, at 94. 
 3. Russell R. Wheeler & Robert A. Katzmann, A Primer on Interbranch Relations, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1155, 1172–73 (2007); ROBERT A. KAGAN, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law 44–51 
(2001). 
 4. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2288 (2011) (Scalia, J. dissenting).  
 5. Skilling v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 2939 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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“legislating from the bench.”6  And legislators have criticized the Court for 
“the denigration . . . of congressional authority.”7 
Commentators have aimed to address this problem by promoting 
better cooperation between legislatures and courts.  They have proposed 
inter-branch committees to enhance communication between courts and 
legislatures, and one author has argued that courts should certify 
questions of statutory interpretation to Congress, so as to provide 
Congress an opportunity to amend the law as it would apply to the 
pending judicial decision.8  These efforts at enhancing judicial-
legislative collaboration aim to prompt Congress to amend an 
ambiguous statute.  But requiring Congress to pass an amendment to the 
law does not alleviate the problems of congressional delay, committee 
stalling, and limits on the legislative agenda that cause Congress’s 
general slowness in correcting legislation that is plainly causing 
confusion among courts.9  Additionally, as discussion of this proposal 
illustrates, judges actually do play an important partnership role in 
developing statutory law; refining it with rule of law, public policy, and 
constitutional values that legislators do not always consider when 
drafting legislation.  Proposals that merely aim to provoke a more 
prompt legislative response do not fully embrace the value that judges 
add to statutory interpretation decisions.  This procedure is designed to 
draw on the relative competencies of judges and legislators to enable a 
true partnership between the branches in updating and adapting statutory 
law to fit unforeseen scenarios. 
Congress would enact legislation providing that the Court, in cases 
where the Justices disagree about best interpretation, could voluntarily 
certify a statement of the competing reasoning (just as would be 
included in a majority and dissenting opinion) along with a multiple 
choice question asking Congress to vote on its preferred outcome.  
Congress would have the option of declining to respond.  The Court can 
weigh the response as it chooses: it could decline to follow it, consider it 
as one factor in the decision along with other tools of statutory 
construction, or rely on a strong congressional preference for one 
 
 6. E.g., Martin Mayer, Why They Legislate ‘From the Bench’, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 
(Sept. 13, 2005), http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0913/p08s02-coop.html; Jeffrey Rosen, What’s 
Wrong with Judges Legislating from the Bench?, TIME MAG. (July 16, 2009), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1910989,00.html#ixzz1iJr2WHLE. 
 7. .Wheeler & Katzmann, supra note 3; Confirmation Hearing of the Nomination of John G. 
Roberts Jr. To Be the Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 2–4 (2005) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/pagedetails.action?granuleId=&packageId=GPO-CHRG-ROBERTS. 
 8. Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 9. For instance, the Court has heard four cases in recent years, all pertaining to the meaning of 
“violent felony” under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act.  Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2283 
(Scalia, J. dissenting). 
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outcome as evidence in favor of that ruling, knowing that a contrary 
outcome would likely be overruled.  This procedure would allow the 
Court to ascertain current democratic preferences more accurately, 
reliably, and efficiently than other sources the Court has relied upon, 
such as post-enactment legislative history, legislative acquiescence, 
linguistic canons, and various other interpretive methodologies. 
Following this introduction, Part II provides brief background on the 
debate about statutory interpretation methodology that is useful for 
framing this procedure.  Part III describes other proposals for judicial-
legislative cooperation which illustrate that judges, academics, and 
legislators recognize this problem, and may be likely to endorse a 
solution along the lines I am proposing.  Part IV provides background 
on certification procedures that serve as precedent for this proposal.  
Part V describes the multiple-choice certification procedure.  Part VI 
explains how the certification procedure would have been invoked in 
three of the Court’s recent decisions addressing slightly different types 
of statutory interpretation problems.  Part VII addresses questions about 
the constitutionality of this proposal.  In conclusion, I will describe how 
this partners the particular competencies of the two branches in dynamic 
statutory interpretation. 
II. THE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION DEBATE 
Our legal regime is dominated by statutes.  Courts deciding questions 
of statutory law are in a more deferential position than when they decide 
questions of common or constitutional law, where they are the final 
authority on meaning.10  There is a strong democratic sentiment favoring 
judicial deference to legislative will, no doubt grounded in anxiety about 
counter-majoritarian courts subverting the choices of elected officials.  
Hamilton expressed this concern in Federalist No. 78, warning that 
courts must not substitute their preferences for those of the legislative 
 
 10. See, e.g., supra note 1; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF 
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010) (noting prominence of statutory law in 
contemporary regime); Linda D. Jellum, “Which is to Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? 
When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 837 (2009) (“Statutory 
interpretation is at the cutting edge of legal scholarship and, now, legislative activity.”); GUIDO 
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1985) (commenting on the dominance of 
legislatures and statutory law); Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges and Legislators: Renewing the 
Relationship, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 279, 279 (1991) (“[The] complexities of the law making and law-
interpreting tasks in the third century of this republic cry out for systematic dialogue between those who 
make and those who interpret legislation.”); JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL 
COMITY (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988); Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between 
Courts and Congress: A Challenge of Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. L.J. 653 (1992); Shirley S. 
Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory 
Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1991). 
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body.  Justice Scalia echoes this concern: “[i]t is simply not compatible 
with democratic theory that laws mean whatever they ought to mean, 
and that unelected judges decide what that is.”11  But judges can be said 
to add value precisely because they are independent of, and can be 
resistant to, democratic actors.  Judicial review has been justified by the 
notion that judges balance out short-sighted and reactionary political 
bodies by making decisions with a “longer view” of history, keeping in 
mind overarching constitutional values, as well as the ideals of stability, 
consistency, reliability, and intelligibility in the law.12  There is a tension 
between this conception of the counter-majoritarian value of judges and 
courts striving to defer as faithfully as possible to the choices of the 
legislature.  Judicial efforts to defer to Congress’s intent have generated 
“interminable repetition of . . . essentially the same methodological 
debates” about how to ascertain what Congress wanted; and there is 
little consistency in their methods for doing so.13  I do not aim to fully 
 
 11. Scalia, supra note 1, at 97. 
 12. Richard Albert, Why Judicial Review: A Preliminary Typology of Scholarly Arguments, 
INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG (Mar. 25, 2013), available at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/03/why-
judicial-review. While a constitutional decision rather than a statutory one, the Court’s discussion in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), describes some of the judicial values that could also 
be said to apply in decisions interpreting legislation: 
[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a 
series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of 
overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective 
costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.  Thus, for example, we may ask whether 
the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; whether the 
rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the 
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; whether related 
principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a 
remnant of abandoned doctrine; or whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so 
differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification. 
Id. at 854–55. 
 13. Gluck, supra note 2, at 1766.  In arguing for more uniform rules of statutory construction, 
Gluck provides a thorough overview of methodological disagreement about how judges should interpret 
statutory law.  Id. at 1761–68.  Justice Scalia recognizes, “[I]t [is] frequently said in judicial opinions of 
my court and others that the judge’s objective in interpreting a statute is to give effect to ‘the intent of 
the legislature.’”  However, the evidence suggests that despite frequent statements to the contrary, “[w]e 
do not really look for subjective legislative intent.”  Scalia, supra note 1, at 91–92.  For more on how 
textualists consider legislative intent, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW (1998); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 
(1983); see also John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419 (2005); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 287, 286–93 (1985); Caleb Nelson, 
What is Textualism? 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005).  Judges who look to sources beyond the text sometimes 
seem to defer to only the enacting legislators’ understanding by imaginatively reconstructing enactment, 
while at other times they aim more generally to serve the overarching purpose of the legislation.  See 
Hart & Sacks, supra note 1, at 1111; Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and 
in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817–22 (1983); Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair 
Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946); POSNER, supra, at 286–93; Nelson, supra; STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR 
DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW (2011); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default 
Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027 (2002).   
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recount the debate between interpretive methodologies here.  Suffice it 
to say that this indeterminacy invites judges to select between 
interpretive methods,14 and gives rise to suspicion that Judges 
manipulate formal reasoning in order to reach their own preferred 
outcomes.15 
Many times, Congress has overridden the Court’s unfavorable 
statutory interpretation decisions by amending the law.16  This requires 
significant legislative resources, and it may be difficult to fit a corrective 
amendment on the overloaded congressional agenda, since enacting new 
legislation takes priority (as it is higher political visibility).  
Additionally, concentration of power in committees and committee 
chairs might stall initiative to override a judicial interpretation, even 
 
 14. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 1, at 1169; Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the 
Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 
VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950); Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 2; Patricia M. Wald, Some 
Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 
214 (1983); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An 
Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 221 (2010). 
 15. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 287 (“The irresponsible judge will twist any approach to yield 
the outcomes that he desires, and the stupid judge will do the same thing unconsciously.”); Brudney & 
Ditslear, supra note 2, at 5–6; Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2086 (2002); Robert A. Katzmann, Making Sense of Congressional Intent: 
Statutory Interpretation and Welfare Policy, 104 YALE L.J. 2345, 2346 (1995) (“When courts interpret 
legislation, . . . they become an integral component of the legislative process.”); Jellum, supra note 10, 
at 839 (“[L]egislatures have increasingly begun to perceive judges as activist meddlers.”).  Even judges 
who earnestly aim to act as neutral ‘faithful agents’ inevitably make interpretive decisions within the 
context of their own ‘normative horizons.’  ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 1, at 1241–42; 
Eric J. Segall, The Court: A Talk with Judge Richard Posner, THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Sept. 29, 2011) 
(“[S]ome judges fool themselves into thinking there is a correct answer, generated by a precedent or 
other authoritative text, to every legal question . . . [p]eople want to avoid . . . ’cognitive 
dissonance,’  . . . [w]e were taught in law school what we are supposed to be doing as judges—apply the 
law, not make it up.”) (quoting Judge Posner). 
 16. E.g., Allison Engine Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662 (2008), 
overruled by Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009); 
S. REP. No. 111-010 (2009) (“This section amends the FCA to clarify and correct erroneous 
interpretations of the law that were decided in Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 
S. Ct. 2123 (2008).”); W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991), overruled by Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 113, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991); Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. 
Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989), overruled by Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 
104 Stat. 978 (1990); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), overruled by 
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1807, 1845 (1986); 
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), overruled by Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986); see also generally Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism’s Failures: A 
Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53 VAND. L. J.REV. 887, 903–10 (2000); ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY 
& GARRETT, supra note 1, at 347–48; Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: 
Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. J. REV. 425, 448 (1992); 
Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 37 
(1991); Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial Interpretations of the 
Meaning of Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB L. 53 (2000); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. 
v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 622–23 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
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when a majority of the legislature opposes it.17  Justice Stevens 
described the Court as doing a “disservice to the Country” if it issues a 
ruling that requires Congress “to take the time to revisit the 
matter . . . whenever its work product suffers from an omission or 
inadvertent error.”18 This consumes significant legislative resources, 
taking time away from other issues that lawmakers might be focusing 
on. 
III. OTHER PROPOSED MECHANISMS FOR INTER-BRANCH COOPERATION 
A number of judges, policymakers, and academics have proposed 
measures for promoting cooperation and communication between courts 
and legislatures.  Many state legislatures have also taken measures to aid 
courts in accurately adhering to legislative will.  This suggests that 
judges and lawmakers recognize the problem, and that they might be 
inclined to take advantage of a procedure along the lines of what I am 
proposing.  While these efforts to address the disconnect between courts 
and legislatures illustrate desire to address the problem, they all fail to 
overcome the inherent problems that arise from relying on Congress to 
amend the law in question. 
Frost’s Argument for Legislative Certification: Frost sets forth a 
certification procedure whereby the Court would send a question to 
Congress in ambiguous statutory interpretation cases.19  After 
identifying many of the advantages of referring a statutory interpretation 
question directly to Congress, including improving communication, 
reducing conflict, best taking advantage of the competencies of each 
branch, and promoting transparency, Frost proposes that courts refer a 
clearly stated question about a statutory ambiguity to the ranking 
members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.20  The 
certifying court would abstain from deciding the case in order to provide 
Congress with at least a six-month opportunity to amend the statute.  
Assuming Congress does so, the amended law would then be applied to 
the pending case.  On Frost’s description, “judicial referral is not 
seeking the current Congress’s interpretation of a previously enacted 
 
 17. For instance, Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett explain that the majority of Congress likely 
disapproved of the Court’s pro-disparate impact interpretation of Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424 (1971), but were unable to enact overriding legislation because the committees were 
“dominated by preferences to the left of chambers on civil rights.  And because those committees 
exercised gatekeeping power over issues on the legislative agenda, they had substantial ability to head 
off overrides of agency policies or judicial decisions.”  ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY, & GARRET, supra note 1, at 
86. 
 18. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 19. Frost, supra note 8. 
 20. Id. at 5–6. 
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statute, but instead is enlisting the current Congress’s help by asking it 
to revise a poorly drafted statute.”21 
Because it envisions staying a judicial decision while provoking 
Congress to amend the ambiguous law, Frost’s proposal leaves 
unresolved the important practical and structural problems identified 
above.22  Frost’s procedure is essentially a judicially prompted 
amendment process.  There is no constraint on the extent to which 
Congress can amend the legislation in question: “the Congress that 
receives a judicial referral may choose to radically alter, rather than to 
clarify, the statute at issue.”23  Because Frost’s proposal essentially 
provides for provoking Congress to amend the law in response to a 
judicial decision, it is functionally similar to the following inter-branch 
committee proposals.  Frost acknowledges that several problems arise 
from allowing Congress unrestrained discretion to amend the law as 
applied to a pending decision: impermissible case-by-case delegation of 
authority to Congress, Ex Post Facto concerns that arise from this 
delegation, politicization of decision making.24  For reasons discussed in 
Part VII, these constitutional concerns are ameliorated when the Court 
constrains Congress to outcomes that the Justices are prepared to adopt 
themselves. 
Interbranch Committees: Judge Cardozo, Justice Stevens, Justice 
Ginsberg, Judge Mikva, Judge Katzmann have all proposed committees 
that would facilitate inter-branch communication.  In 1921, Judge 
Cardozo lamented that in a regime increasingly dominated by statutory 
law, “[t]he courts are not helped as they could and ought to be in the 
adaptation of law to justice.”  Judge Cardozo’s problem was that there 
was no way to signal to the legislature that it should update or weigh in 
on the development of the law.25  Cardozo argued for a “Ministry of 
Justice” that would be composed of members of the judiciary, the 
legislature, law schools, and the bar.  Cardozo’s Ministry would mediate 
between the Court and the Legislature by studying the law and 
recommending changes so that “[t]he spaces between the planets will at 
last be bridged.”26 
In a similar vein, Justice Stevens also proposed that there should be a 
 
 21. Id. at 38. 
 22. One commentator responds to Frost’s proposal: “The devil is all in the details, I think, since 
there would have to be some meaningful guidelines on the exercise of such a certification power.  As the 
article shows, drawing these lines is hard work and it is hard to see why the certification system 
wouldn’t be gamed.” Ethan Lieb, Certifying a Question to Congress?, PRAWFSBLOG (May 18, 2007), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2007/05/certifying_ques.html. 
 23. Id. at 38. 
 24. Frost, supra note 8, at 36–41. 
 25. Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 113 (1921). 
 26. Id. at 125.  
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standing committee in Congress charged with identifying conflicts that 
arise from ambiguity or omissions in statutes, and drafting bills to 
resolve them.  He argued that when “the conflict is over the meaning of 
an ambiguous statutory provision, it may be both more efficient and 
more appropriate to allow Congress to make the necessary choice 
between alternative interpretations of the legislative intent.”27  If the 
Court were faced with a case that involved pure ambiguity or 
uncertainty about the meaning of a statute, “it would seem to make good 
sense to assign Congress the task of performing the necessary corrective 
lawmaking.”  In a footnote, Justice Stevens explained, “I do not mean to 
suggest that the Supreme Court should seek to certify issues of statutory 
construction to a legislative committee.  Rather I am suggesting that the 
policymaking branch of the federal government might assign itself that 
task.”28  Importantly, Justice Stevens’ statement seems to suggest that a 
certification procedure would be acceptable and even desirable if the 
legislature itself adopted the practice.  (The ‘certifying’ that Justice 
Stevens envisions appears to contemplate sending the question to a 
legislative committee, instead of to the entire legislature for a floor vote.  
A vote on preferences by the whole legislature is more democratically 
legitimate than a committee’s response.) 
Justice Ginsburg, Judge Robert Katzmann, and Judge Abner Mikva 
have also proposed and attempted implementing a “transmission belt” 
between the judiciary and Congress.  The belt would convey judicial 
opinions indicating uncertainty about a statute’s meaning to a statutory 
revision committee composed of members of the House and Senate as 
well as retired members of the judiciary.29  The committee would “hear 
and initiate action on pleas for a clear statement of ‘what Congress 
meant (or in any event what it means now.)’”30  Mikva envisions that: 
[T]he lawyers who argue those cases, and certainly the administrators 
who initiate the interpretation and enforcement process, should be 
called . . . [and] that the opinions of courts of appeals and the Supreme 
Court interpreting statutes be distributed to all members of the House and 
Senate having responsibility for the statute in question.31 
In a slightly different vein, Judge Calabresi has also proposed a 
 
 27. John Paul Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177, 183 (1982).  
 28. Id. at n.20. 
 29. Wheeler & Katzmann, supra note 3; Robert A. Katzmann, No Court is an Island, 8 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 115 (2006); Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 1417, 1420–21 (1987); Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 10; Abner J. Mikva, 
Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 627 (1987); Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr’s 
Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 384 (1987). 
 30. Ginsburg & Huber, supra note 29, at 1433. 
 31. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, supra note 29, at 630–31. 
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“constitutional remand”: In evaluating the constitutionality of a state law 
whose rational basis findings were out of date, Judge Calabresi argued 
that the matter should be ‘remanded’ so the legislature could provide an 
updated statement on its contemporary rational basis for the law.32  
While the “constitutional remand” was not proposed in the context of 
interpreting a statute, it provides another example of judicial efforts to 
invite legislative input on a pending decision. 
State Measures: Along these lines, a number of states have 
established law revision commissions that periodically review judicial 
decisions interpreting legislation in order to identify defects or 
anachronisms in statutes that are causing the judiciary trouble, or being 
applied in an unfavorable manner.33 
All of these procedures are geared toward prompting Congress to 
amend legislation.  Because these proposals do not offer a means for 
circumventing the costly amendment process, they do not overcome a 
general lack of initiative to amend existing law, given policymakers’ 
occupation with new legislation on more pressing political issues.  They 
also do not avoid the challenge of mustering agreement on the scope and 
language of a new amendment, or control and stalling by non-
representative committee members, which might preclude Congress 
from successfully amending a law.  Compared with inter-branch 
committee proposals and Frost’s proposal of referring a statute to 
Congress for revision, Congress has more incentive to take advantage of 
the middle-of-the road procedure I propose here: Congress has a chance 
to address the problem without going through the resource and time 
intensive process of amending the legislation.  While voting on a 
certified question would not create the same binding solution as 
amending the law—the Court could always decline to follow Congress’s 
vote—it would give Congress an efficient way to address a problem that 
may not rise to the priority level of amending a statute.34  Following a 
brief background on inter-jurisdictional certification procedures, I will 
 
 32. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 738 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
 33. Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 10, at 1061–68. 
 34. I should note there are two existing ways that Congress might weigh in on pending judicial 
decisions.  Congress is able to enact a sense-of-Congress resolution expressing its views on the subject. 
Sense-of-Congress resolutions present the same practical problems that have inhibited congressional 
response to judicial decisions: because the sense-of-Congress resolution is not judicially prompted, 
gathering support for such an initiative is vulnerable stalling, delay, and preoccupation with new policy 
matters.  Moreover, it would be unlikely for a sense-of-Congress resolution to speak as specifically to 
the choice between the competing rationales that the Justices have defined.  Essentially, this procedure 
is a judicially prompted and judicially constrained sense-of-Congress resolution.  A second alternative is 
Congress filing an amicus brief.  A Congressional amicus brief faces the same problems of initiative, 
directly addressing the precise alternatives the Justices are willing to endorse, and it also suffers 
representative problems, since amicus briefs are generally filed by particular members of Congress, 
rather than representing the strength of support within the whole body. 
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describe the procedure in more detail, and show how it could have been 
used in some of the Court’s recent statutory interpretation decisions. 
IV. CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES 
Certification is a process whereby one decision-making body obtains 
an answer to a question of law from another entity, where each could 
legitimately make a decision in that area.  Certification mediates among 
different jurisdictions and branches of government that are both sources 
of authority on a legal question.35  Federal appellate courts can certify 
uncertain questions to the U.S. Supreme Court,36 and federal courts can 
certify questions to state supreme courts. This process developed in 
response to an interpretive problem faced by federal courts applying 
state law.  This creates challenges similar to statutory interpretation—in 
both instances courts seek to deferentially interpret law created by an 
external source of legal authority.  Federal courts struggled to rule on 
ambiguous or unresolved questions of state law, including state statutes, 
by anticipating and speculating what ‘reasonable’ lawyers and judges 
trained in the state’s law would do.  In 1945, frustrated with federal 
courts’ faltering efforts to predict state law, the Florida state legislature 
enacted a law authorizing the Florida Supreme Court to adopt rules for 
accepting certified questions from federal courts of appeal and the 
United States Supreme Court.  Since then, a vast majority of state 
legislatures have passed procedures for certifying questions from federal 
courts to their supreme courts.37 
Certification procedures are voluntary on both ends; the state supreme 
court can accept or decline the certified question, but it must provide a 
response to the certifying federal court.38  The U.S. Supreme Court and 
federal courts have certified a variety of questions to state supreme 
courts, pertaining to common law and statutory interpretation.39  This 
 
 35. James William Moore & Allan D. Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification in 
Federal Appellate Procedure, 35 VA. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1949). 
 36. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (2006). 
 37. Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State Law to State Courts: 
A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 164 (2003); Eric Eisenberg, Note, A Divine 
Comity: Certification (At Last) in North Carolina, 58 DUKE L. J. 69, 71 n.13 (2008). 
 38. Both federal and state courts have adopted standards for determining whether to expend the 
time to certify or answer a question, depending on the importance of the question to the outcome of the 
case and to state policy.  O’Mara v. Town of Wappinger, 485 F.3d 693, 698 (2d Cir. 2007); W. 
Helicopter Servs., Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 811 P.2d 627, 633 (Or. 1991). 
 39. These decisions include questions about state intestate law: Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 249 
(1963); Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963) (whether a higher state court had power to 
review the constitutional claims in question); Kremen v. Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(whether an Internet domain name is “property” subject to the tort of conversion); Woodward v. 
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002) (the definition of a ‘child’ for the purposes of 
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inter-jurisdictional certification is touted as promoting comity and 
federalism; allowing state courts greater self-determination in shaping 
their law, and greater control over state policy and state regulation of 
primary conduct.40  This rationale extends to federal agencies 
interpreting state law, as a Delaware statute permits the state supreme 
court to answer questions certified to it from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.41  Delaware’s law is significant, as it provides 
an example of not only inter-jurisdictional certification (from federal to 
state court), but inter-branch certification (executive-judicial), as I am 
proposing here (judicial-legislative).  The rationale for adopting federal-
state court certification—reducing the need to speculate on the meaning 
of law created by an external lawmaking body—is similar and applies to 
the objective of the Court when interpreting a statute. 
V. A MULTIPLE-CHOICE CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE 
Congress would enable this procedure by enacting legislation 
providing for “fast-track certification.” Fast-track legislation mandates 
that certain measures are subject to expedited consideration in one or 
both houses.  Fast-track procedures eliminate committee reporting, floor 
debates or amendments, and limit the time in which the measure must be 
voted upon.42  Similar to existing fast-track legislation, this legislation 
would: (1) prohibit sending the certified question to committee, (2) set a 
time limit within which the question must reach the House and Senate 
floor for consideration (i.e., the fast-track legislation for considering 
federal trade agreements states that a vote on final passage of a trade 
implementing bill “shall be taken in each House on or before the close 
of the 15th day” from when it was reported to the floor43), (3) 
specifically limit the time allotted for floor debate and prohibit 
amendments, and (4) ensure that a final floor vote within the time 
 
state intestate law); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Serio, 98 N.Y.2d 198, 204 (2002) (whether a state statute 
regulating insurers prohibits a “preferred repairer” clause in vehicle casualty policy); and Landoil Res. 
Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., 77 N.Y.2d 28, 31 (1990) (whether a defendant’s activities 
qualify as “doing business” within the state for the sake of the state’s long-arm statute). 
 40. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (“[Certification] save[s] time, energy, and 
resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism.”); Verity Winship, Cooperative Interbranch 
Federalism: Certification of State-Law Questions by Federal Agencies, 63 VAND. L. REV. 181, 183 
(2010). 
 41. Winship, supra note 40, at 192–95; CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emp. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 
228 (Del. 2008). 
 42. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., “FAST-TRACK” OR EXPEDITED PROCEDURES: THEIR PURPOSES, 
ELEMENTS, AND IMPLICATIONS 1 (Jan. 21, 2003). Congress has enacted these forms of fast-track 
procedures for voting on recommendations for military base closures and for legislation to implement 
major international trade agreements. 
 43. Id. at 4. 
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permitted cannot be prevented through delay (such as filibuster) in either 
house.44 
Both sides of this procedure would be voluntary—the Court would 
only certify questions when the conference agrees to it as described 
below, and the legislature would have the option of declining to answer 
the question.  I imagine that the Court should voluntarily invoke this 
procedure only after hearing oral argument, conferencing the case, 
debating reasoning supporting different views, and determining that 
there will very likely be at least one dissenting opinion.  Preserving the 
procedure for use only where Justices endorse different outcomes 
ensures that Congress is constrained to elect between outcomes that 
Justices, in their legal expertise and application of statutory 
construction, deem the best outcome (therefore implicitly constitutional 
and legally viable).  Justices would prepare statements detailing their 
own statutory interpretation analysis (basically a summary of what 
would be the majority and dissenting opinions), including their own 
views about controlling methodology (e.g., Justice Scalia’s commitment 
to adhering to the text’s plain meaning), substantive canons (e.g., 
presumption against retroactivity, lenity) and consistency with precedent 
or other areas of the law.  They would also draft a narrowly framed 
multiple-choice question presenting the discrete choice between the 
alternative interpretations.  Just like a draft opinion, these materials 
would be circulated to all members of the Court for approval, and 
Justices would suggest changes to the formulation of the statements, 
question and the answers, and negotiate the final version to be sent to 
Congress.  The question formulated through the Justices’ negotiation 
would be worded carefully to present the ambiguity as abstractly, 
neutrally and with as few additional words beyond those in the statute as 
possible, without referring to facts of the specific case, or suggesting 
one outcome over the other.  These documents would not identify which 
Justices are supporting either of the outcomes. 
Before moving on, I should say an additional word about the Court’s 
administration of this process: Questions might arise about what would 
happen in the event that Justices cannot agree about whether to certify 
the question, or as to the wording of the question.  I am relying on the 
Court’s ability, as a deliberative decisionmaking body, to negotiate 
compromise and adhere to neutral procedures despite disagreement.  
This ability is demonstrated in that the Court maintains collegiality in 
making contentious decisions as to whether to grant cert, whether to 
issue orders granting additional time for oral argument or other 
procedural matters, and deciding upon the terms and language of 
 
 44. These are the typical provisions of effective fast-track procedures.  Id. at 3. 
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opinions.  In addition to negotiating the language of written opinions, 
the Court has also long managed to reach agreement on wording for 
questions certified to state courts.  I expect the conference would 
likewise be able to formulate a consistent, neutral process for 
determining whether to certify a question that is deemed fair and 
workable, and that the Justices respect despite disagreement about the 
outcome of a decision.  The conference could adopt a standard similar to 
deciding whether to grant cert: Justices could vote on whether to certify 
a question, the Court would do so if four Justices favor it.  Or the Court 
might set the bar lower, allowing certification whenever at least one 
Justice calls for certifying the question.  And there is no reason to expect 
the Court would be any more paralyzed by disagreement in formulating 
the question presented to Congress than it is when circulating and 
negotiating an opinion draft.  Justices regularly have deep disagreements 
about language and rationale for the ruling, and often go through many 
circulations before an opinion satisfies all members endorsing the 
outcome.  The Court is accustomed to compromising over significant 
differences in order to keep the institution functioning.  Finally, because 
the certifying  a question is essentially  a tool of statutory construction, a 
member of the Court who does not agree with the methodology could 
dissent on these grounds, arguing that certification was not an 
appropriate method for deciding this case (one can imagine that a justice 
might categorically disagree with certification, as Justice Scalia does 
with legislative history).  A dissenting Justice might also argue that the 
certified question was wrongly phrased. 
The congressional proceedings on a certified question would look like 
this: The memo summarizing the legal reasoning of the potential 
majority and dissent, along with the question, would be introduced on 
the floor, and distributed to members of Congress.  Importantly, 
members of Congress would receive no indication of which Justices are 
associated with the different outcomes presented.  A floor vote would be 
scheduled within fifteen days of the question’s introduction.  On the day 
of the scheduled vote, there would first be a vote on whether to answer 
the question.  If a majority favors not answering the question, then there 
is no second vote, and the legislature is essentially punting the decision 
back to the Court.  Even this response would be informative to the 
Court.  It would provide some license to Justices, generally 
conscientious about lending sufficient deference to the will of elected 
officials, to speak more plainly in terms of their own judgment about 
how the statute should apply as a matter of the overarching policy, 
practical concerns, or synthesis with existing law. 
If a simple majority votes in favor of answering the question, the 
second vote would ask which of the two alternatives it should be.  The 
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result of the vote in each house would be reported back to the Court.  
Because Congress’s preferences are only evidentiary in the Court’s 
decision, there is no need for a majority strong enough to pass 
legislation to support one interpretation.  It is important that the 
congressional vote is reported in terms of aggregate numbers (e.g., 
64/99 voting Senators support interpretation “a”, and 35/99 support “b”; 
320/400 voting Representatives support interpretation “a”; and 80/400 
support “b”) since the purpose of the procedure is to provide the Court 
evidence that allows it to gauge the strength (or uncertainty) of 
congressional preferences.  A strong majority of Congress preferring 
one ruling would indicate that Congress could be inclined to overrule an 
interpretation to the contrary.  On the other hand, if a weak majority 
preferred one ruling, or there is almost equal division, this suggests that 
the law is genuinely ambiguous, and Congress is itself ambivalent or 
indeterminate about what the law should say.  Somewhat like a 
congressional decision not to respond to the question, an ambivalent 
response from Congress may signal to the Court that judicial expertise is 
warranted in determining which interpretation to adopt.  The next 
section will illustrate how the procedure would apply in several of the 
Court’s recent statutory interpretation decisions. 
VI. APPLYING THE PROCEDURE IN RECENT STATUTORY DECISIONS 
Here is how the procedure could have been used to address three 
slightly different interpretive questions presented in recent statutory 
cases—straightforward ambiguous language, whether a statute delegates 
interpretive authority to an administrative agency, and whether a statute 
makes a clear enough statement to overcome the presumption imposed 
by a substantive canon of construction. 
Ambiguous language: In Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance 
Plastics Corp,45 the Court was asked to decide between two possible 
meanings of the words “file[] any complaint.”  Katsen’s suit alleged that 
his employer violated a provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
making it unlawful “to discharge . . . any employee because such 
employee has filed any complaint . . . under or related to [the Act],” by 
firing Katsen.  Katsen alleged that he was discharged because he 
complained orally to his employer that its method of calculating 
employees’ clock-in and clock-out times violated the Act.  The Court 
addressed whether “filed any complaint” includes oral complaints made 
to the employer.46  Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, 
 
 45. 131 S.Ct. 1325 (2011). 
 46. Id. at 1329 (emphasis in original). 
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acknowledged that the word “file” had different meanings: some 
dictionary definitions contemplate a complaint made in writing, while 
others suggest that something may be filed orally; in records of various 
proceedings, legislators, judges, and administrators have all used the 
word “file” in conjunction with oral statements; and other provisions of 
the Act do not make clear whether a filing is inherently a written 
complaint.47  Hence, “the text, taken alone, cannot provide a conclusive 
answer to our interpretive question.”48  Justice Breyer reasoned that 
“file” must be understood as including oral complaints, on account of 
“the Act’s basic objective, . . . to prohibit ‘labor conditions detrimental 
to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for 
health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers,’” and that it 
“relies for enforcement of its substantive standards on information and 
complaints received from employees.”49  Justice Breyer asked: 
Why would Congress want to limit the enforcement scheme’s 
effectiveness by inhibiting use of the Act’s complaint procedure by those 
who would find it difficult to reduce their complaints to writing, 
particularly the illiterate, less educated, or overworked workers who were 
most in need of the Act’s help at the time of passage?50 
Dissenting, Justice Scalia concluded that “filed any complaint” referred 
to a much more limited realm of activities, not including any complaints 
made directly to the employer.  In the dissent’s view, “filed” implied 
only formal charges made in an official court or administrative setting.  
The dissent also speculated about what Congress wanted: “Congress 
may not have . . . provide[d] a private cause of action for retaliation 
against complaints[] because it was unwilling to expose employers to 
the litigation, or to the inability to dismiss unsatisfactory workers, which 
that additional step would entail.”51 
If invoking a certification procedure, the Court would first write up a 
statement of the legal reasoning in the opinions of Justice Breyer and 
Justice Scalia, then draft a certified question along the lines of the 
question presented.  The question and answers might look like this: 
Question: § 215(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act makes it unlawful 
“to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee 
because such employee has filed any complaint . . . under or related to 
[the Act].”  Does the term “filed any complaint” in § 215(a)(3): 
Responses: (a) include oral complaints made directly to the employer; or  
 
 47. Id. at 1331–33. 
 48. Id. at 1333. 
 49. Id. at 1333 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)). 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 1339 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
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(b) include only formal charges made in an official court or 
administrative proceeding and “not cover complaints to the employer at 
all.”52 
Agency Interpretations: Another slightly different question arises 
when an agency’s interpretation of its enabling statute is at issue, and 
under Chevron v. N.R.D.C., the Court must address both whether an 
ambiguity in the statute amounts to a delegation of lawmaking authority 
to the agency (Chevron step 1), and second, whether the interpretation 
the agency selected is based on a permissible construction of the statute 
(Chevron step 2).53  A certification procedure seems particularly apt to 
Chevron deference cases because inquiry into what Congress wanted is 
twofold: first, whether Congress wanted to delegate lawmaking power to 
another body, and second, whether Congress would approve of the 
agency’s use of this authority.54  A certification procedure could be 
informative at both layers of the Chevron inquiry.  One recent Chevron 
case might serve as an example of how certification would work in the 
deference context: In Arlington v. F.C.C., the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) argued that the Communications Act, by authorizing 
the agency to “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary 
in the public interest to carry out [its] provisions,” delegated it power to 
define the specific statutory provision, “within a reasonable period of 
time” for responding to a wireless siting application.55 The question 
presented was whether the Court should defer to the agency’s 
interpretation of the statute as giving it authority to define “within a 
reasonable period of time” as 90 to 150 days, specifically.  The agency 
argued that Congress gave it this authority by providing it power to 
prescribe necessary rules and regulations; and the courts should defer to 
this determination.  The majority reasoned that principles of Chevron 
deference applied to the agency’s assessment that the statute gave it 
power to make these specific rules.  Because the statute’s language 
allowed the agency to promulgate necessary rules and regulations, the 
agency’s decision that it had lawmaking power to fill in “reasonable 
period” was within the scope of its statutory authority.56 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence argued that the Court should not defer to 
the agency’s determination about whether the statute delegated it 
 
 52. Id. at 1337 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 53. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).  
 54. The idea that judges speculate as to congressional intent even more in Chevron cases is 
supported by findings that the Court has been more likely to cite legislative history in Chevron 
deference cases.  William N. Eskridge & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L. J. 1083 (2008). 
 55. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
 56. Id. at 1874. 
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authority to define a “reasonable period”; “[t]he question whether 
Congress has delegated to an agency the authority to provide an 
interpretation that carries the force of law is for the judge to answer 
independently . . . considering ‘traditional tools of statutory 
construction.’”57  Justice Breyer independently concluded that the 
“reasonableness” provision does, in fact, leave a gap for the agency to 
fill.  He therefore agreed with the judgment that the FCC lawfully 
promulgated regulations interpreting this provision. 
The dissent argued that the majority and the lower court overlooked 
Chevron step 1 by failing to evaluate whether the specific provision, 
“within a reasonable period,” amounted to a delegation of interpretive 
authority.  The dissent emphasized structural principles pertaining to the 
role of the judiciary vis-a-vis Congress and the Executive.  It explained 
that the judiciary is to determine what the law is, as defined by 
Congress.  “We give binding deference to permissible agency 
interpretations of statutory ambiguities because Congress has delegated 
to the agency the authority to interpret those ambiguities,” and “before a 
court may grant such deference, it must on its own decide whether 
Congress . . . has in fact delegated to the agency lawmaking power over 
the ambiguity at issue.”58  Congress’s general grant of authority to 
prescribe rules as necessary to carry out the statute “does not necessarily 
mean that Congress granted the agency interpretive authority over all its 
provisions.”59 
While this decision implicates more fundamental questions about the 
relative powers of courts and agencies, the core question was really 
whether Congress’s general grant of power to prescribe rules and 
regulations amounted to a delegation of authority to declare lawmaking 
power with respect to this specific provision.  The Court’s discussion 
could have been enriched by the views of Congress.  By indicating 
whether it viewed the general grant of rulemaking authority as 
delegation to the agency to flesh out the meaning of a specific provision, 
Congress would be indicating its view on the extent that an agency may 
assume a general grant of rulemaking power as authorizing it to 
determine its own authority to fill in any specific provision in the 
statute.  In this case, the following two questions might be presented: 
Question: The Communications Act grants the Federal Communications 
Commission power to “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be 
necessary in the public interest to carry out [its] provisions,” 47 U.S.C. § 
201(b).  Does this delegate the FCC authority to determine its own power 
 
 57. Id. at 1876 (Breyer, J. concurring)(internal quotations omitted). 
 58. Id. at *17 (Roberts, J. dissenting).  
 59. Id. at *21.  
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to define “a reasonable period” in which local governments should 
respond to a wireless siting application? 
Responses: (a) the power to prescribe necessary rules and regulations 
under § 201(b) grants the FCC power to determine that it has authority to 
define the specific provision, “within a reasonable period”; or  
(b) § 201(b) does not delegate power to the FCC to determine that it has 
authority to define the specific provision, “within a reasonable period”; 
any delegation of power must come from ambiguity within the provision 
being defined, “within a reasonable period.” This provision is sufficiently 
ambiguous to grant the FCC authority to issue an interpretation entitled to 
judicial deference. 
(c)  § 201(b) does not delegate power to the FCC to define the specific 
provision “within a reasonable period”; any delegation of power must 
come from ambiguity within the provision being defined, “within a 
reasonable period.” This provision is NOT sufficiently ambiguous to 
grant the FCC authority to issue an interpretation entitled to judicial 
deference. 
If a simple majority prefers answer (a) or (b), the second question would 
be: 
Question: The FCC has determined that “a reasonable period” for a state 
or local government to respond to a wireless siting application is 90-150 
days.  The Secretary’s determination is: 
Responses: (a) a permissible construction of the statute; or (b) arbitrary, 
capricious, or inconsistent with the statute. 
In a case where the question presents three options to Congress, all three 
alternatives would be simultaneously voted on, and the aggregate 
support for each option would be reported to the Court.  This eliminates 
any risk that the ordering of the vote would skew outcome towards one 
option or another.60  The number of legislators favoring one of three 
options would be just as useful to the Court as knowing the number 
favoring one of two options.  In either case, the Court would have the 
 
 60. In three outcome cases, there might be concern for Condorcet’s Paradox; a vote between 
three choices equally preferred amongst three groups of voters allows one group to set the agenda, by 
giving up their first preference choice and voting for their second choice.  See JERRY L. MASHAW, 
GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 12–13 (1997).  A 
voting system that avoided Condorcet’s Paradox would adopt a Condorcet Method, where each voter 
lists his preference rankings amongst three alternatives in order, and the winner is not determined by 
who receives the majority of first choice votes, but who has the overall highest preference ranking.  
Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, The Fairest Vote of All, SCIENTIFIC AM. MAG., Feb. 9, 2004.  Potential 
for this type of compromising should not detract from legitimacy of a congressional response any more 
than it detracts from the legitimacy of legislation enacted through ordinary horse trading.  After all, 
legislation is well recognized to reflect strategic compromise and horse-trading amongst various 
constituencies in Congress, and not expected to represent perfect majority rule, as in a sum tally of the 
individual preference rankings of each member. 
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sort of evidence that this procedure is best suited to provide: whether an 
overwhelming majority of Congress prefers one outcome, such that the 
Court is likely to be overruled if it adopts a different interpretation. 
Substantive Cannons: The Court relies on substantive cannons to 
promote constitutional or rule-of-law values external to the statute being 
interpreted.  Substantive cannons set a default construing legislation in 
line with overarching legal values by putting a heavier burden on 
Congress to clearly express its intent to enact legislation contrary to 
those values.  By requiring Congress to “speak clearly” in order to pass 
a statute that encroaches on constitutional values, these canons “trigger 
democratic (in the sense of legislative) processes and to ensure the 
forms of deliberation, and bargaining, that are likely to occur in the 
proper arenas.”61  For instance, the federalism cannon, requiring 
Congress to “clearly express” its intent to create an exemption from 
state taxation,62  and the presumption against preemption, requiring 
Congress to make “clear and manifest” its purpose to supersede states’ 
historic police powers63 impose  a higher burden on Congress to 
override state sovereignty values—making sure Congress really 
recognizes and means this result.  Similarly, the common-law canon sets 
a default in favor of consistency and predictability in the law by 
requiring Congress to clearly indicate its intention for a statute to mean 
something contrary to the common law that previously governed the 
question.64  And the presumption against retroactivity, requiring 
Congress to “clearly state” its intent for a provision of the statute to 
apply retroactively, protects values of fair notice incorporated in the due 
process and Ex Post Facto clauses of the Constitution.65  The canons 
have been described as a “clarity tax” that raises the cost of passing 
constitutionally sensitive legislation,66 and criticized as a “judge-made 
constitutional penumbra.”67  This procedure would be apt in cases where 
the Justices disagree about whether Congress has made a clear statement 
sufficient to overcome such a presumption.  This would enable the Court 
to notify Congress that the legislation encroaches on a constitutional 
value guarded by a substantive canon, and ask Congress whether it 
really means to encroach on these values, without taking the more-
extreme measure of automatically presuming the contrary. 
 
 61. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 335 (2000). 
 62. Fl. Dept. of Rev. v. Picadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 544 U.S. 33, 50 (2008). 
 63. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 564 (2009). 
 64. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 359 (2005). 
 65. Landgraf v. U.S.I. Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
 66. John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 403 
(2010). 
 67. Posner, supra note 13, at 816. 
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For instance, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,68 the Court was 
faced with the question whether the Alien Tort Statute, providing that 
“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations 
or a treaty of the United States,” applies to torts occurring in a sovereign 
territory outside the United States. (The defendant oil companies—
incorporated in the Netherlands and England—were alleged to have 
aided the Nigerian government in violently suppressing Nigerian 
demonstrators objecting to the environmental effects of the companies’ 
activities in Nigeria.) In concluding the law did not apply to torts 
committed in foreign territories, the majority relied on the presumption 
against extraterritoriality—”‘[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication 
of an extraterritorial application, it has none.’”69  This “presumption that 
United States law governs domestically but does not rule the 
world . . . serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws 
and those of other nations which could result in international discord.”70  
The majority reasoned that there were three familiar offenses to which 
ATS applied when it was first enacted—violation of safe conducts, 
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy—and ATS’s 
intended application to these torts does not evince the “clear indication 
of extraterritoriality” required to overcome the presumption.71  Justice 
Kennedy concurred with the majority’s result and reasoning, noting that 
future cases may require more elaboration on the proper implementation 
of the presumption against extraterritorial application.72  And Justice 
Alito’s concurrence, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality had not been overcome; and went 
further to state that there is no cause of action under ATS unless the 
domestic conduct is sufficient to violate an international law norm “as 
definite in content and acceptance” as the three principal offenses that 
were familiar when ATS was enacted.73 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor, 
concurred in the judgment based on the specifics of this case, but argued 
for a very different understanding of whether ATS applies to conduct 
outside the United States.  They found that ATS did clearly indicate 
extraterritorial application because it “was enacted with ‘foreign 
matters’ in mind”: “the statute’s text refers explicitly to ‘alien[s],’ 
‘treat[ies],’ and ‘the law of nations.’”; its “purpose was to address 
 
 68. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 69. Id. at 1664 (quotations omitted). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1665 (quotations omitted). 
 72. Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
 73. Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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‘violations of the law of nations, admitting of a judicial remedy and at 
the same time threatening serious consequences in international 
affairs.’”; and it is undisputed that Congress intended ATS to apply to 
acts of piracy taking place on the high seas, which the Court has 
traditionally treated as foreign territory.74  Because, in the concurrence’s 
view, ATS is clearly intended to apply extraterritorially, ATS could 
apply to actions occurring in sovereign territory outside the United 
States if the defendant an American national or if “the defendant’s 
conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American 
national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the 
United States from becoming a safe harbor . . . for a torturer or other 
common enemy of mankind.”75  In this case, there was not a sufficient 
connection between the United States and the parties or the conduct for 
a national interest to be affected. 
In this case, the Court would provide Congress with a statement of 
the majority’s reasoning and the reasoning in Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence that argues for an extraterritorial interpretation of ATS.  (It 
would likely be unnecessary to provide a statement of the reasoning in 
the other two concurrences, since both adopt the majority’s view that 
ATS fails to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial 
application.  This would be for the Court to decide, depending on 
whether Justice Kennedy or Justice Alito’s concurrence was seen as 
endorsing a sufficiently different reading of the statute that it should be 
included in the alternatives put before Congress.)  In this case, the Court 
might certify the following question: 
Question: The Alien Tort Statute provides “[t]he district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.” The Court presumes that “when a statute gives no clear 
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”  When the Alien 
Tort Statute was enacted, it was understood to apply to the offense of 
piracy, which occurs on the high seas.  Does the statute provide a clear 
indication of extraterritorial application such that it can be applied to 
conduct occurring outside the United States in the territory of a sovereign 
nation? 
Responses: (a) The Alien Tort Statute does not provide clear indication 
of extraterritorial application; or  
(b) The Alien Tort Statute does clearly indicate extraterritorial 
application, and can therefore be applied to offenses that occur outside 
the United States in the territory of a sovereign nation when defendant is 
 
 74. Id. at 1672 (Breyer, J. concurring) (quotations omitted).  
 75. Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J. concurring). 
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an American national, or “the defendant’s conduct substantially and 
adversely affects an important American national interest, and that 
includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from becoming 
a safe harbor . . . for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.”  
Congress’s response would allay the concern underlying the 
presumption against extraterritoriality: to “ensure that the Judiciary does 
not erroneously adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign 
policy consequences not clearly intended by the political branches.”76 
VII. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A MULTIPLE-CHOICE LEGISLATIVE 
CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE 
While this procedure calls on both branches to function differently 
from their conventional roles, I would maintain that the procedure 
comports with constitutional limitations on the legislature and judiciary, 
especially because it is voluntary for both branches.  I will address 
potential constitutional objections to this certification procedure, which I 
would expect to arise under Separation of Powers, the Ex Post Facto 
clause, and the Presentment clause, as well as concern for balance of 
power between the enacting and subsequent Congresses. 
A. Separation of Powers 
The Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence has been described as 
a “doctrine easily invoked, but not clearly explained.”77  There are two 
approaches taken to addressing separation of powers questions: 
formalist and functionalist.78  Formalists view the powers of each branch 
as limited to powers specifically prescribed in the vesting clauses of the 
Constitution: “Article I grants Congress ‘[a]ll legislative Powers herein 
granted;’ Article II grants the president ‘executive Power;’ and Article 
III grants the judiciary ‘judicial Power.’”79  Under a formalist view, 
separation of powers analysis turns on whether a branch of government 
performs a function that falls outside the literal definition of its vested 
power; i.e. whether the legislature’s activity is, in fact, ‘legislating.’80 
The functionalist approach recognizes that each branch of government is 
given ‘core’ functions by the vesting clauses, but these do not represent 
 
 76. Id. at 1664.  
 77. Jellum, supra note 10, at 855. 
 78. Id. at 854–55.  
 79. Id. at 861.  
 80. The Court has explained that legislative acts “[have] the purpose and effect of altering the 
legal rights, duties, and relations of persons . . . outside the Legislative Branch.”  INS v. Chahda, 462 
U.S. 919, 952 (1983). 
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absolute limitations.  The goal of the analysis is to ensure no branch 
becomes too powerful, rather than formally restrict each branch to the 
literal definition of its vested function.  The Court has recognized that 
the functionalist approach may more accurately meet the demands of an 
ever-changing government, explaining “[t]he Constitution by no means 
contemplates total separation of each of these three essential branches,” 
as “a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one 
another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of 
governing itself effectively.”81  This is particularly true in light of the 
increasingly complex executive institutions in the modern administrative 
state.82  The functional approach asks two questions to determine 
whether separation of powers has been violated: Whether one branch 
has “interfere[d] impermissibly with the other’s performance of its 
constitutionally assigned function,” or whether “one branch assume[d] a 
function that more properly is entrusted to another.”83 
It might be argued that this procedure violates separation of powers 
because the legislature would be assuming a judicial function when 
voting on a question about a statute’s meaning.  After all, the Court has 
explained that the power of “‘[t]he interpretation of the laws’ is ‘the 
proper and peculiar province of the courts.’”84  But with this procedure 
Congress is only acting as a part of the judicial decisionmaking process, 
at the request of the Court, to provide evidence that the Court has 
deemed relevant and asked to hear.  The Court has upheld at least one 
Act of Congress doing much more to dictate the outcome of a pending 
decision. 
In Robertson v. Seattle Audobon, a provision attached to 
appropriations legislation referred to two pending cases by name and 
caption number, and was plainly designed to dictate the outcome of 
those cases.85  The Seattle Audobon plaintiffs alleged that the Forest 
Service and Bureau of Land Management violated the administrative 
guidelines governing the oversight of protected habitats under the 
National Environmental Policy Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and 
the National Forest Management Act when they proposed timber 
harvesting in protected habitats of the spotted owl.  Congress’s next 
appropriations act contained an amendment specifying that less rigorous 
guidelines, with which the agencies were already compliant, applied to 
the protected habitats in question.  The legislation specifically stated that 
 
 81. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976). 
 82. Jellum, supra note 10, at 870 (“[For] a government confronted with the complexity of the 
twenty-first century, functionalism seems to be winning the war.”). 
 83. Chahda, 462 U.S. at 919, 963 (Powell, J. concurring); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 121. 
 84. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 222 (1995). 
 85. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U.S. 429, 434–35 (1992). 
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“the Congress hereby determines and directs that management of areas 
according to . . . this section . . . is adequate consideration for the 
purpose of meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for the 
consolidated cases . . . ,” and listed names and caption numbers of the 
two pending cases.86  The Ninth Circuit found that the congressional 
enactment “directs the court to reach a specific result and make certain 
factual findings under existing law in connection with two [pending] 
cases” and “held the provision unconstitutional under United States v. 
Klein, . . . which it construed as prohibiting Congress from 
‘direct[ing] . . . a particular decision in a case, without repealing or 
amending the law underlying the litigation.’”87 
The Court unanimously reversed, finding Congress’ case-specific 
enactment constitutional since it “compelled changes in law, not 
findings or results under old law.”88  The Court reasoned that “what 
Congress directed—to agencies and courts alike—was a change in law, 
not specific results under old law.”89 
If what Congress did in Seattle Audobon was constitutional—
declaring the law requires ‘x’ as applied to two pending cases; it is 
likely that Congress providing evidence of its preference between the 
options predefined by the Court, would also be constitutional.  Because 
the vote is in no way binding, and the options presented are based on 
readings that the Justices would otherwise reach, Congress does far less 
to compel a specific result or change the law than it did in Seattle 
Audobon.90 
Nor does this certification procedure suffer the problems associated 
with the legislative veto that the Court found unconstitutional in INS v. 
Chadha.91  One house retained the automatic and absolute power to 
review and veto each executive decision granting a pardon from 
deportation.  While the majority found that the legislative veto violated 
the bicameralism and presentment clauses, Justice Powell’s concurrence 
argued that it should be invalidated on separation of powers grounds.  
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 436.  In United States v. Klein, 13 Wall 128 (1871), the Court held unconstitutional 
legislation invalidating the preexisting judicial rule that a presidential pardon would be taken as 
presumptive evidence that the pardoned individual had not aided or abetted the enemy during war. This 
statute violated separation of powers because it “prescribe[d] rules of decision to the Judicial 
Department of the government in cases pending before it.”  Id. at 133–34. 
 88. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 438.  
 89. Id. at 439. The Court has explained that “[w]hatever the precise scope of Klein . . .  later 
decisions have made clear that its prohibition [on enactments prescribing specific outcomes] does not 
take hold when Congress ‘amend[s] applicable law.’”  Miller, 530 U.S. at327 349. 
 90. In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995), the Court held that the legislature 
could not “retroactively command[] the federal courts to reopen final judgments” without violating 
separation of powers.  
 91. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).  
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According to Justice Powell, the House’s actions were “clearly 
adjudicatory” because “[t]he House did not enact a general rule; rather it 
made its own determination that six specific persons did not comply 
with certain statutory criteria.  It thus undertook the type of decision that 
traditionally has been left to other branches.”92  With this procedure, as 
in Seattle Audobon, Congress speaks to a general rule.  Congress is not 
asked to vote on how the law applies to a given set of facts; but rather, it 
makes a statement about what it would prefer the law to mean in the 
abstract.  Most critically, this procedure is not intrusive on the 
judiciary’s function because it is voluntary and non-binding.  In a sense, 
when the Court chooses to certify a question, it is doing little more than 
it does when it looks at floor statements, a committee report or another 
form of legislative history; it is simply seeking testimony of 
congressional preferences to fit into its own interpretive analysis; 
evidence it may weight or disregard as it sees fit. 
Further indication that this procedure comports with separation of 
powers may be found in the presumed constitutionality of legislative 
directives on statutory interpretation.  Commentators have concluded 
that legislative rules prescribing methods of statutory construction, as 
enacted by a number of state legislatures,93 would be unlikely to violate 
separation of powers, and have urged Congress to enact rules governing 
interpretation of federal statutes.94  Even statutory default rules encroach 
more on judicial decisions than the certification procedure proposed 
here.  First, these rules are binding on the courts, and, second, they 
dictate a particular outcome insofar as they require the outcome 
compelled by one interpretive methodology to trump the outcome 
compelled by another interpretive method which the Justices may prefer. 
B. Presentment clause 
Another conceivable objection is that accepting a congressional vote 
on a statutory interpretation question without the President’s approval 
would violate the Presentment Clause.95  First, “[n]ot every action taken 
by either House is subject to the bicameralism and presentment 
requirements.”  Only acts of legislative power are subject to these 
requirements, and this depends “upon whether they contain matter 
which is properly to be regarded as legislative in its character and 
 
 92. Id. at 964–65 (Powell, J. concurring). 
 93. See Gluck, supra note 2. 
 94. See Jellum, supra note 10; Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory 
Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2088 (2002); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative 
Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1698–99 (2002). 
 95. See Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).  
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effect.”96  Because this procedure is not law-making; it amounts to 
something closer to a judicially prompted “sense-of-Congress” 
resolution, it does not seem to trigger the requirements of the 
presentment clause. 
While I do not think that Congress’s response need be subject to 
presentment requirements, there is no reason that the question and the 
legislature’s response could not be presented to the President.  The 
President could have the option of “vetoing” the legislature’s response 
by indicating that she prefers a different interpretation; in which case the 
court could consider the President’s contrary view in determining how 
to weight Congress’s preference, this could potentially be a basis for 
lessening the weight given to congressional preferences.  The 
President’s response would be, like Congress’s, wholly optional.  The 
President would be likely to weigh in only in the event of significant 
disagreement with the legislature’s vote.  This is because a presidential 
vote contrary to Congress’s would counteract legislative preferences, 
and it would therefore have the same meaning in terms of power-
dynamics as vetoing a piece of legislation. 
C. Ex Post Facto 
Justice Powell’s Chadha concurrence also emphasized Ex Post Facto 
concerns that arise from allowing Congress to make case-by-case 
determinations, stressing “the danger of subjecting the determination of 
the rights of one person to the tyranny of shifting majorities.”97  A 
politicized body might be inclined to make rash decisions motivated by 
the political climate surrounding a specific case, regardless of the 
preexisting law that the subject of the decision has relied upon.  “Unlike 
the judiciary or an administrative agency, Congress is not bound by 
established substantive rules.  Nor is it subject to the procedural 
safeguards . . . that are present when a court or an agency adjudicates 
individual rights.”98  Frost acknowledges that her proposal, prompting 
the legislature to amend the law as it applies to a pending decision, may 
raise Ex Post Facto concerns.  This risk is eliminated here, where the 
Justices would first rely on their tools of construction, including 
substantive canons such as the presumption against retroactivity 
(presuming prospective application so as to guard against Ex Post Facto 
violations),99 before putting a potential interpretation as an option before 
Congress.  The Justices would not give Congress the option of an 
 
 96. Id. at 952. 
 97. 462 U.S. at 961 (Powell, J. concurring) (internal quotations omitted). 
 98. Id. at 966.  
 99. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269–70 (1994). 
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interpretation that they are not prepared to adopt, and thus impliedly find 
constitutional.  The fact that this procedure is bookended by judicial 
review also mitigates the problem of politicized decisionmaking: The 
Court could alter the way that it weighs Congress’s vote if it observes 
that the specifics of this particular case were highly politicized, and that 
Congress was focused on the outcome rather than the abstract meaning 
of the statute.  It may be apparent, in retrospect, that legislators made 
public statements about their views on the facts underlying the case 
(e.g., “this particular defendant should be imprisoned for the heinous 
crime he committed”), rather than the abstract interpretive question, or 
that media coverage framed the vote almost exclusively as being about 
whether this defendant should go to prison, rather than the abstract 
statutory question—”does term ‘y’ in the statute mean ‘a’ or ‘b’?”.  If 
this were the case, the Court might explain that because Congress’s vote 
appeared to be oriented around the result of this particular case, it is not 
convinced Congress considered the meaning of the legislation in 
abstract (in terms of how it would apply in other cases, how it fits with 
other statutory provisions or the policy animating that statute, its 
compatibility with other areas of the law, consistency with previous 
judicial decisions, or constitutional values). 
The possibility of this occurrence should not rule out the viability of 
certification.  The potential for this sort of politicization will vary widely 
depending on the nature of the case.  A question of less public salience, 
such as the delegation of authority to the FCC, or the meaning of the 
term “file” within the Fair Labor Standards Act, would be less 
conducive to the same sort of case-specific politicization.  Vulnerability 
to this sort of case-specific politicization is a consideration for the Court 
in determining whether to certify the question.  Also, political debate 
about the abstract statutory question, rather than the outcome of this 
specific case, would not undermine the legitimacy of this procedure.  If 
for instance, the public debates whether “file” within the Fair Labor 
Standards Act should include an oral complaint made directly to the 
employer, it would be legitimate for this discourse to bear on Congress’s 
vote, since the whole purpose is to defer to contemporary democratic 
will. 
D. Intra-branch Tension—Subsequent vs. Enacting Legislature 
One of the most significant concerns may be that this certification 
procedure takes into account the will of the contemporary legislature, 
rather than the enacting one.  It could be argued that a later Congress 
should have no constitutional role in elaborating on or interpreting an 
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earlier Congress’s enactments.100  It is not clear that the Constitution 
requires any particular balance of power between enacting and 
subsequent legislatures.  The Court has described the Constitution as 
being concerned with “the distribution of powers among the three 
coequal Branches; it does not speak to the manner in which authority is 
parceled out within a single Branch.”101  Article I says nothing about 
balance of power between previous and subsequent Congresses, and 
charges Congress with designing its own procedural rules. 
If not characterized as a constitutional or balance of power issue, one 
could argue that a later Congress has no status as an authority on 
legislation enacted by earlier Congress.  But this claim belies the Court’s 
consistent practice of looking to post-enactment legislative signals in 
statutory interpretation decisions.  With these decisions, the Court very-
plainly recognizes the relevance of the preferences of post-enactment 
Congresses.  Considering the preferences of more contemporary 
Congresses makes sense, insofar as Justices aim to avoid an 
interpretation that today’s Congress will overrule.102  Looking to the 
preferences of present-day legislators also comports with democratic 
values:  contemporary legislative will, as opposed to the will of enacting 
legislators, best represents current political preferences; and deferring to 
present political preferences generates greater political satisfaction than 
deferring to past political preferences.103  For this reason, one writer has 
observed that given the choice, most legislators (and their constituents) 
would prefer to influence the meaning of all present legislation, rather 
than permanently influence the future interpretations of legislation 
enacted while they were in office.104 
Third, it makes practical sense to consider contemporary preferences 
because interpretation of a statute often becomes more problematic with 
time as social and legal context changes.105  Contemporary legislators 
provide more valuable guidance on what a statute should mean in light 
of present circumstances.  Positive political theory provides a dynamic 
account of statutory law akin to common law.  Instead of having one 
 
 100. James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle 
Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1994); see also; Consumer Prod. Safety Commn. v. 
GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 117–18 (1980); United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960). 
 101. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 167–68 (1991) (internal citations omitted). 
 102. Edward P. Schwartz et al., A Positive Theory of Legislative Intent, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 51, 54 (1994). 
 103. Elhauge, supra note 13. 
 104. Id. at 2029 (“Even for the enacting government, a general default [interpretive] rule that 
accurately tracks current preferences (rather than the preferences of the government that enacted each 
statute) will maximize its political satisfaction.”).  
 105. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Post-Enactment Legislative Signals, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 
75, 78 n.14 (1994). 
29
Evans: What Would Congress Want? If We Want to Know, Why Not Ask?
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013
1220 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
meaning, fixed at the point of enactment, legislation develops and 
changes through ongoing collaboration between legislators overseeing 
agencies that administer the statute and interpret it to address new 
problems, and courts who apply it to particular situations.106  An 
advantage of common law is that courts have flexibility to update the 
law as circumstances change and problems in its application become 
apparent through litigation.  The same updating and adapting is 
desirable in a regime governed by statutory law in order to make the law 
best fit present reality.  This procedure is geared toward facilitating 
collaboration between Congress and the Court in this sort of dynamic 
elaboration of statutory law. 
The greater relevance of recent legislative preferences is reflected in 
canons addressing the balance of power between Congresses over time: 
the last in time rule provides that, when two pieces of legislation cannot 
be interpreted so as to avoid conflict, the most recently enacted one 
governs.  The rule against entrenchment prohibits previous Congresses 
from enacting laws constraining the authority of future Congresses.  
Both of these rules reflect the value that more contemporary 
congressional preferences trump older ones. 
The Court has often found the views or actions of more recent 
Congresses relevant to interpreting a provision enacted by an earlier 
Congress.  In Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil,107 the Court held 
that the Merchant Marine Act authorized the Secretary to release a ship 
owner from conditions imposed in exchange for a subsidy provided 
under the Act, once the ship owner repaid the subsidy.  The provision in 
question was enacted in 1934, and the 1971 and 1972 Congresses had 
proposed an amendment to the Act granting the Secretary authority to 
do exactly this.  However, the House Committee report explained that it 
removed the language because the instances where the Secretary might 
invoke its authority to release a ship from conditions imposed as a part 
of a subsidy arose too infrequently, and the Committee “questions the 
desirability of general legislation to deal with such an unusual 
situation.”108  The Court relied on this “understanding” of the 
subsequent Congress, explaining that “while the views of subsequent 
Congresses cannot override the unmistakable intent of the enacting one, 
such views are entitled to significant weight, and particularly so when 
the precise intent of the enacting Congress is obscure.”109  The same 
year as Seatrain, another decision explained that while, “arguments 
predicated upon subsequent congressional actions must be weighed with 
 
 106. Eskridge, supra note 105. 
 107. 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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extreme care, they should not be rejected out of hand as a source that a 
court may consider in the search for legislative intent.”110 
In F.D.A. v. Brown & Williamson,111 the Court concluded that 
tobacco products were not “restricted devices” under the 1965 Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act.112  Rather than relying exclusively on analysis 
of what the 1965 Congress meant by the term “restricted device,” the 
Court also focused on laws enacted by subsequent Congresses, which 
acknowledged the importance of tobacco to national industry.  
“Congress’ . . . decisions to regulate labeling and advertising and to 
adopt the express policy of protecting commerce and the national 
economy . . . to the maximum extent reveal its intent that tobacco 
products remain on the market.”113  The Court’s opinion plainly speaks 
in the present tense of ongoing congressional intent. The Court 
explained: 
At the time a statute is enacted, it may have a range of plausible 
meanings.  Over time, however, subsequent acts can shape or focus those 
meanings . . . a specific policy embodied in a later federal statute should 
control our construction of the earlier statute, even though it has not been 
expressly amended.114 
Furthermore, in 2008, the Court relied on the history surrounding a 
1995 amendment to interpret the scope of liability under a much older 
section of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.  Leading up to 
the 1995 amendment, the Senate subcommittee considered a 
recommendation to establish a private cause of action for aiding and 
abetting violations of the securities laws.  However, the enacted 
amendment authorized only the Securities and Exchange Commission., 
not private plaintiffs, to prosecute aiders and abettors.  The Court relied 
on the deliberations that took place during the 1995 amendments in 
order to interpret a preexisting provision of the Act as not allowing 
actions by private parties against aiders and abettors of securities 
violations.  The Court quoted Seatrain’s statement that views of 
subsequent Congresses are “entitled to significant weight,” and Brown 
& Williamson’s explanation that the implications of a later statute may 
alter the meaning of an earlier one.115  The Court has also explained that 
 
 110. Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 
455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982) (relying on the legislative history—comments in the Conference Committee 
analysis—of the 1972 amendments to the Equal Opportunity Act to inform interpretation of a provision 
enacted in 1964). 
 111. 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 112. Id. at 134. 
 113. Id. at 139 (internal quotations omitted). 
 114. Id. at 143. 
 115. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 163 (2008).  
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more recent legislators’ understanding of the statute shapes “public 
reliance” on whatever the later Congress’s understanding of the law 
was, even if different from the original Congress’s view.  Justice Scalia, 
who opposes reference to legislative history, has acknowledged the 
relevance of this form of reliance.116 
Another more subtle way that the Court recognizes the relevance of 
contemporary legislators’ preferences is by considering Congress’s 
acquiescence to an agency interpretation as reason to adopt that reading. 
In Bob Jones v. United States,117 the Court upheld the Internal Revenue 
Service’s (IRS) determination that private schools which discriminate 
based on race are ineligible for tax-exempt non-profit status under 
federal tax laws.  In reaching this result, the Court noted that post-
enactment Congresses had considered and ultimately rejected 
amendments to override the agency’s interpretation: “Failure of 
Congress to modify the IRS rulings . . . and Congress’ 
awareness . . . when enacting other and related legislation make out an 
unusually strong case of legislative acquiescence . . . and ratification by 
implication.”118  The fact that post-enactment Congresses had accepted 
the agency’s interpretation says nothing about what the enacting 
Congress intended.  In finding recent Congress’s acquiescence to an 
agency’s ruling a reason to adopt an interpretation of a statute, the Court 
recognizes that the views of contemporary legislators are at least 
relevant, if not controlling, as to what a statute should mean.  This 
shows how statutory meaning is dynamic—it is not fixed at what the 
enacting legislature had in mind, but changes as agencies, overseen in 
part by Congress, develop interpretations to fit new circumstances. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Insofar as the Court is, as the foregoing discussion suggests, 
concerned with deferring to contemporary democratic preferences, this 
certification procedure would enable it to do so more accurately, 
legitimately, and reliably than adducing these preferences from the 
forms of post-enactment legislative history relied upon in the decisions 
discussed above.  A critique of legislative history—both enacting and 
post-enactment Congresses—is that it is non-representative.  There is no 
guarantee that views expressed in the committee reports or floor debates 
 
 116. Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395 (1991); Justice Scalia also invoked post-
enactment legislative views in Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 78 (1992) (Scalia, J. 
concurring) (recognizing that subsequent enactments “must be read” as an “implicit acknowledgement” 
of the chosen interpretation). 
 117. Bob Jones v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 118. Id. at 599. 
32
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss4/1
2013] WHAT WOULD CONGRESS WANT? 1223 
reflect the majority preference.  “If ordinary legislative history 
is . . . often cooked up by congressional staff and lobbyists to try to slant 
interpretation after the fact, the possibility for abuse is worse with 
subsequent legislative history.”119  The certification procedure avoids 
this problem because it allows the Court to much more reliably ascertain 
the preference of the majority.  Those who oppose considering evidence 
of legislative intent because of the unrepresentative and potentially 
selective nature of legislative history may be more open to considering 
the legislative views expressed through a fully representative vote. 
In conclusion, I stress that I am not advocating supplanting 
Congress’s judgment for that of the Court.  This procedure is geared 
toward facilitating collaboration between Congress and the Court, 
drawing from the particular competencies of each branch: Congress is 
democratically representative and has lawmaking prerogative; the 
Justices make decisions from a “longer view” of history, keeping in 
mind overarching constitutional values, and the ideals of stability, 
predictability, and intelligibility in the law.120  While I have argued that 
this procedure would aid the Court insofar as it speaks in terms of 
deferring to legislative will, there are reasons that Congress’s vote 
should only be taken as marginally persuasive, not dispositive, evidence 
in support of one interpretation.  First, busy legislators presented with a 
certified question might be inclined to vote rashly in response based on 
their immediate reaction to the question, without having the time to 
research the statute or delve more deeply into its context, application, 
and effects.  Beyond the few who are particularly interested in the issue, 
otherwise preoccupied legislators could be unlikely to dedicate the same 
reasoned thought and analysis to the matter that a the Court might—
looking at the context of enactment, the problems that are playing out in 
administration, how the interpretation comports with other portions of 
the law, or the impact the interpretation would have on other cases.  Or 
legislators might be heavily swayed by instant political preferences 
rather than long term overarching constitutional and public policy values 
that judges take into account when interpreting legislation.  One could 
imagine lobbyists petitioning legislators to vote one way or another, or 
constituents otherwise pressuring for particular results.  Legislators 
might also see the vote as an opportunity for horse-trading, agreeing to 
vote in one direction in exchange for other constituents’ votes on some 
other matter.  These factors don’t seem illegitimate, per se, as a basis for 
defining the law, as they describe the climate in which laws are initially 
enacted.  But they do show that judges make a valuable contribution to 
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the meaning of legislation when they interpret it.  This procedure would 
eliminate speculation about legislative intent, and knowing Congress’s 
preference, the Court’s decision might transparently discuss the 
interplay between congressional preferences and legitimate judicially-
enforced values—values that safeguard the constitution and promote 
consistency, predictability, and uniformity in our law. 
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